

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

Elections as Causes of Democratization? Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective

In Table A1 we repeat our main analysis using the NELDA coding of elections (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). The data and sample are otherwise identical to Table 2 in the main text.

Table A1: NELDA Election Coding

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$
Election _{<i>t</i>}	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.05 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Auth. in <i>t</i>	Auth. in <i>t</i>	Auth. in <i>t</i> – 1	Auth. in <i>t</i> – 1
N	452	411	441	402

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Estimates via fixed effects logistic regression.

In Table A2 we repeat our main analysis using the elections coded in the V-DEM project (Coppedge et al., 2017). The data and sample are otherwise identical to Table 2 in the main text.

Table A2: V-DEM Coding

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$
Election _{<i>t</i>}	-0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Auth. in <i>t</i>	Auth. in <i>t</i>	Auth. in <i>t</i> – 1	Auth. in <i>t</i> – 1
N	407	374	398	367

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Estimates via fixed effects logistic regression.

In Table A3 we repeat our main analysis using fixed effects logistic regression instead of OLS. The data and sample are otherwise identical to Table 2 in the main text.

Table A3: Logistic Regression Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$
Election _{<i>t</i>}	-21.63 (55091.87)	-0.09 (1.21)	-0.46 (1.33)	0.05 (1.38)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Auth. in <i>t</i>	Auth. in <i>t</i>	Auth. in <i>t</i> - 1	Auth. in <i>t</i> - 1
N	159	105	157	105

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Estimates via fixed effects logistic regression.

In Table A4 we control as well for the competitiveness of each election, as coded in Table 1 in the main text. The data and sample are otherwise identical to Table 2 in the main text.

Table A4: Distinguishing Between Competitive and Uncompetitive Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$
Election _{<i>t</i>}	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.04)
Competitive Election _{<i>t</i>}	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.06)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Auth. in <i>t</i>	Auth. in <i>t</i>	Auth. in <i>t</i> - 1	Auth. in <i>t</i> - 1
N	452	411	441	402

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Estimates via fixed effects logistic regression.

In Table A5 we include a different measure of legislative competitiveness—a binary variable ($Competitive_t$) coded as one if the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) records an opposition holding at least one seat in parliament—and interact it with our indicator of elections to isolate the effects of elections under conditions of legislative competitiveness from completely uncompetitive elections.

Table A5: Elections and Legislative Competitiveness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$
Election _{<i>t</i>}	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
Competitive _{<i>t</i>}	0.05 (0.05)	0.07 (0.09)	0.02 (0.04)	0.07 (0.10)
Election _{<i>t</i>} × Competitive _{<i>t</i>}	-0.03 (0.02)	0.05 (0.07)	0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.09)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Auth. in <i>t</i>	Auth. in <i>t</i>	Auth. in <i>t</i> – 1	Auth. in <i>t</i> – 1
N	273	241	274	243

Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Estimates via OLS.

In Table A6 we control for three important demographic variables: gross domestic product per capita (in log terms), yearly growth rate, and percent urban population, all taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015).

Table A6: Economic and Demographic Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$	$DemTrans_{t+1}$	$DemTrans_{t+5}$
Election _{<i>t</i>}	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.10	0.08	0.05	0.02

	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.19)
Growth	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Urbanization	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Auth. in t	Auth. in t	Auth. in $t - 1$	Auth. in $t - 1$
N	130	102	130	103

Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Estimates via OLS.

In Table A7 we repeat the exercise in Table A6, but measure the two economic variable using the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al., 2015).

Table A7: Economic and Demographic Controls, Alternative Measures

Dependent Variable	(1) $DemTrans_{t+1}$	(2) $DemTrans_{t+5}$	(3) $DemTrans_{t+1}$	(4) $DemTrans_{t+5}$
Election $_t$	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.15)
Growth	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Urbanization	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Auth. in t	Auth. in t	Auth. in $t - 1$	Auth. in $t - 1$
N	354	322	354	323

Bibliography

- Beck T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P. (2001). New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions. *World Bank Economic Review*, 15, 165-176.
- Coppedge M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S., Skaaning, S., Teorell, J., Altman, D., et al. (2017). V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v7: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
- Feenstra R. C., Inklaar, R., Timmer, M. P. (2015). The Next Generation of the Penn World Table. *American Economic Review*, 105, 3150-3082.
- Hyde S., Marinov, N. (2012). Which Elections Can Be Lost? *Political Analysis*, 20, 191-210.
- World Bank. (2015). *World Development Indicators*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.