

Election turnout in authoritarian regimes

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ABSTRACT

What explains election turnout in authoritarian regimes? Despite the significant energy, resources, and time ruling parties devote to improving the participation rates of citizens, there exists extraordinary variation both within and across authoritarian regimes. This paper hypothesizes that election turnout is explained by contestation, coercion and clientelism. To test this theory, the paper uses an original dataset capturing turnout rates for 548 legislative elections in 108 countries between 1960 and 2011. The resulting empirical analysis confirms these Hypothesis – with one notable exception. Instead of encouraging turnout amongst citizens, clientelism discourages it. This counterintuitive finding occurs because citizens lack the optimum incentives for participation and ruling parties lack effective monitoring strategies of that behavior. The conclusion of the paper addresses its implications for existing theories of authoritarian politics and proposes several avenues for further research on election turnout under authoritarianism.

1. Introduction

In December 2018, legislative elections were held in Bangladesh and Togo. Despite “victory” being all but a certainty for the Awami League and the Union for the Republic, significant emphasis was still placed on achieving high turnout. In addition to being a symbol of electoral integrity and assertion of popular legitimacy, it is known that authoritarian regimes use participation rates as a criterion for judging the competence, loyalty and trajectory of their political elites (Landry et al., 2010; Blaydes, 2011; Malesky and Schuler, 2011). To get citizens to the polls on this occasion, the ruling parties offered basic foodstuffs, free transportation, festival events, improved infrastructure and small bribes, while also threatening harsh fines, physical harm and service disruptions. After the polls closed, voter turnout was reported as 80.0 percent in Bangladesh and 59.2 percent in Togo, respectively. Given the effort each ruling party put into mustering citizens to the voting booths, such variation is puzzling.

The causes and patterns of voter participation in elections has long been a subject of scholarly research. Despite a rich body of knowledge, what is known about electoral turnout is mostly limited to democracies. Since the normative focus has so far been on nominally free and fair elections, which ostensibly offer superior motivation for participation due to the allure of meaningful representation, there has been a lack of comparable analysis on voter turnout in authoritarian regimes. In the view of Brownlee (2011, 818): “Turnout bears on how comparativists

interpret elections in authoritarian conditions, but popular participation seldom receives systematic attention.” We address this deficit by arguing that turnout rates in authoritarian elections is driven by contestation, coercion and clientelism.

Our paper makes two major contributions at the intersection of flawed elections, voter behavior and authoritarian politics. Theoretically, we hypothesize how different forms of electoral contestation, alternate targets of coercion and varying degrees of clientelism explain election participation within and across authoritarian regimes. This framework makes it possible to understand the causal relationship between voter participation and existing theories of authoritarian politics. Despite positioning elections as an explanatory variable, research on the functions of flawed elections, emergence of democracy protests, and democratizing power of repetitive elections has so far been unable to incorporate voter participation into that analysis. Empirically, we utilize a dataset on voter turnout in authoritarian regimes covering 548 legislative elections in 108 countries from 1960 to 2011. Working with this data, we make three overall findings: (1) less electoral contestation increases turnout, while more contestation decreases turnout; (2) coercion against opposition actors and the fear of severe government reprisals increases turnout, but widespread violence between civilians decreases it; and (3) clientelist exchange in the form of targeted benefits actually decreases turnout. Between these contributions, we offer an account of election participation in authoritarian regimes which can be interpreted institutionally, longitudinally and cross-regionally.

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We begin by surveying the scholarship on voter turnout in political regimes. Despite established explanations on the conditions considered to encourage and discourage participation, we find that the present state of knowledge is mostly confined to democracies. Addressing this deficit, we hypothesize that turnout in authoritarian regimes is explained by contestation, coercion and clientelism. The next section discusses the research design and validates our argument using a new dataset on election turnout in authoritarian regimes. The fifth section discusses the findings and provides an explanation for why clientelism – counterintuitively – decreases election turnout in authoritarian regimes. The conclusion offers a program for future research with respect to election turnout in authoritarian regimes and existing theories of authoritarian politics. Ultimately, to our knowledge, we offer the most comprehensive comparative study of election turnout in authoritarian regimes.

2. Election turnout in comparative perspective

The study of election turnout has overwhelmingly focused on democratic regimes. At the aggregate level, voter participation is demarcated by three explanations: socio-economic, institutional and political (Geys, 2006).

Despite the lack of an explicit model, the socio-economic explanation finds that turnout is positively affected by levels of economic development (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998) and past turnout (Aldrich et al., 2011). In addition, it details how it is negatively affected by population size (Blais and Carty, 1990) and ethnic diversity (Lago et al., 2017; Martinez i Coma and Nai, 2017). The institutional explanation focuses on the very rules, norms and procedures that structure behavior. In addition to the design of the electoral system (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998) and concurrency of elections (Geys, 2006), compulsory voting has been found to be a very prominent and positive stimulus for election turnout (Blais, 2006). A final explanation comprises two key political factors – competitiveness and corruption. On the one hand, higher levels of voter participation can be expected when there is more electoral competition, which has been traditionally measured as the distance between the two main parties or candidates. On the other hand, lower levels of participation result from excessive nepotism, patronage, secret party funding and overtly close ties between politicians and business interests (Stockemer et al., 2013). Ultimately, these approaches have provided a robust account for variation in election turnout around the democratic world.

An equivalent body of research on election turnout in authoritarian regimes has been excluded from this research agenda (Stockemer, 2016, 903). This imbalance can arguably be traced to the prior dismissal of these elections as mere window dressing – i.e., events devoid of the freedom and fairness necessary to facilitate the expression of consent and make participation meaningful. A recent exception is De Miguel et al. (2015). Relying on surveys in the Arab world, they found that citizens care about policy outputs and therefore participate in elections as a way of expressing their views about the regime and its performance. From an aggregate perspective, Martinez i Coma (2016) also tested whether the socio-economic factors, institutional, and political factors that explain turnout in democracies could be used to explain turnout in non-democracies, but found few significant commonalities. Using the case of Zimbabwe, finally, Croke et al. (2016) reveal how education substantially reduces the likelihood that people will participate because they believe the act of voting does not provide genuine input into the political process.

Beyond such exceptions, the more substantive scholarly focus has been on how election turnout affects political outcomes sought by authoritarian regimes. One school of thought is that higher turnout is preferable: it provides dictators with information on the competence, loyalty and popularity of political elites; helps resolve conflicts amongst key individuals within the ruling coalition; buttresses the legitimacy claims of ruling parties; and creates the impression of ruling party invincibility (Magaloni, 2006; Morgenbesser, 2016a; Malesky and

Schuler, 2011; Blaydes, 2011). Yet a smaller body of research has shown that lower turnout is sometimes preferable for authoritarian regimes (Robinson and Torvik, 2009; Collier and Vicente, 2012). This argument hinges on ruling parties not only having prior information on the identities of opposition supporters and swing voters, but also the capacity to minimize their participation. Between these two schools of thought, it is worth reiterating that our main goal is an aggregate-level explanation for election turnout in authoritarian regimes.

This focus offers a point of departure from the predominant emphasis on turnout in democratic regimes. The distinguishing feature of authoritarian elections is *ex ante* certainty; meaning there is a positive probability that the ruling party or leader will win (Przeworski et al., 2000). “Political engagement is a distinctly different phenomenon in authoritarian regimes,” Solt (2008, 50) underscores, “participation in elections, for example, is simultaneously coerced and an instrument of coercion.” Such differences are reflected in the advent of “electoral authoritarianism” and “competitive authoritarianism” to capture the uneven playing field typical of these contests (Schedler, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2010). This known condition does not explain, however, why election turnout varies across and within authoritarian regimes.

2.1. Election turnout in authoritarian regimes

Our first explanation for election turnout in authoritarian regimes is contestation. This captures whether the elections allow for multiple candidates/parties or are restricted to one candidate/party. Since parties are the organized groups by which citizens express their political preferences, the form of competition permitted means there are artificial limitations on the agency of voters. Specifically, contestation is a marker of choice and a guideline for participation. We identify two general scenarios: competitive and uncompetitive elections. The former denotes an environment where the incumbent deliberately dilutes the capacity of opponents to win office, intentionally infringes upon civil liberties, and regularly abuses state resources to create an uneven playing field (Levitsky and Way, 2002). The latter denotes a situation where the incumbent legally bars opposition actors from existing, violates basic civil liberties using overt coercion and monopolizes access to resources, media and the law (Magaloni, 2006). Between them, voter turnout should be higher in uncompetitive (one-party) systems. This is due to the existence of interlocking perceptions within these authoritarian regimes, whereby the “proven ability to extract long-term compliance from their citizens as well as their elites tends to generate the twin belief that they rest on both voluntary and involuntary compliance” (Schedler, 2013, 218). Since there are no such thing as non-aligned (or opposition) voters in such regimes, more participation is always better for the incumbent. This is illustrative of how the different levels of social and organizational pressure exhibited across authoritarian regimes explain different levels of electoral participation within them.

Hypothesis 1. Turnout will be higher in uncompetitive elections than competitive elections.

The dilemma of whether to abstain or participate in flawed elections has traditionally produced a variety of responses from opposition actors working in authoritarian regimes. An opposition boycott denotes the deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by an eligible political party (Buttorff and Dion, 2017). The pertinent issue is the effect of such boycotts on voter turnout. We identify three influential factors. The first is that self-identified supporters of the opposition will be less inclined to participate based on the withdrawal of an ideological and/or instrumental motivation. If an opposition party is pushing for democratization, for example, then abstention reduces the likelihood of that outcome eventuating (Donno, 2013b). The second factor is that an opposition boycott can compel established swing voters to refrain from showing up. Since abstaining sends the signal that the process will lack freedom and fairness (Lindberg, 2006), we assume these voters will respond negatively to the sudden loss of choice in what is supposed to be

“competitive” election. This effect would be even more pronounced if coercion is nonexistent and/or clientelism is ineffective against non-aligned voters (see further below). The final factor is that an opposition boycott might influence the self-identified supporters of the ruling party. An aura of invincibility, for example, could inadvertently contribute to a decline in voter turnout as supporters decide that their vote is inconsequential to the pending triumph. Ultimately, whatever the effects opposition boycotts have on participation in flawed elections, the result should be unidirectional.

Hypothesis 1A. Turnout will be lower in the event of an opposition boycott.

A key tool wielded by authoritarian regimes to “win” elections is the threat or use of coercion. This hazard can come in the form of direct coercion via state security services (i.e., military, police) or indirect coercion via nominally independent groups (i.e., militia, paramilitary). In Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF government has traditionally relied on both actors during election periods (Bratton and Masunungure, 2007). What effect such coercion has on turnout, however, has not been firmly established. One possibility is that it increases participation as citizens fear harm for wanting to abstain, support the opposition or not support the ruling party. On Ethiopia, Hafner-Burton et al. (2016) note how concerns within the national government about poor turnout resulted in local militia telling citizens to register and vote for the ruling party or face reprisals. A similar pattern has been observed in Kenya (Gutiérrez-Romero et al., 2014). Another possibility is that coercion decreases participation because it compels apparent supporters of the opposition to stay away from the polls for fear of injury. On Mexico, Simpser (2013) finds that excessive electoral manipulation by the ruling party depressed voter participation by 4.5 percent for each election during the 1970s and 1980s. Importantly, he clarifies that the broader effects coercion have on participation are so far indeterminate.

Our argument is that participation increases when coercion is exclusively targeted against opposition candidates, parties and workers. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (1970–1977), Guinea (1968–1974) and Tunisia (1994–2009), for example, exhibit low correlation when intimidation against opposition and citizens is compared. In Singapore, the People’s Action Party has a long track record of using lawsuits against opposition leaders during election periods, while leaving citizens free to exercise their votes in an otherwise unfair system (Rajah, 2012). In such cases, citizens are more likely to turn out because they are not immediately suffering physical harm, anticipate it will forestall future physical harm, and may want to display solidarity with opposition actors. Despite being a contingent set of circumstances, it speaks to difference between the “threat” and “application” of coercion.

Hypothesis 2A. Turnout will be higher when coercion is targeted towards opposition candidates, parties and workers.

In addition to deciding upon the target of coercion, authoritarian regimes must determine its intended scale. The possibilities might range from sporadic instances of low-intensity coercion in parts of the country to frequent instances of high-intensity coercion in most of the country (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014). The intended scale can also vary at the sub-level depending on the ethnic and religious identities being targeted, which itself makes the logistics of coercion difficult. Our argument is that the worse the overall “atmosphere” of the election, the more citizens will be motivated by fear to participate.

Hypothesis 2B. Turnout will be higher when violence between civilians is more frequent and dispersed.

The severity of the coercion is also assumed to have an impact on election turnout. Having selected a target and determined the scale of coercion, the infringement pursued by authoritarian regimes can range from empowerment rights (e.g., assembly, association and movement) to physical integrity rights (e.g., death, imprisonment and torture). In this context, we understand participation to be based on a set of rational

calculations. As Schedler (2013, 131) writes, “The enjoyment of personal freedom and physical integrity, though often excluded from narrow conceptions of personal utility, seem often more important than the enjoyment of material goods.” This suggests that citizens should maximize their personal safety – and, thus, more actively participate – when they are coerced in the most severe kind of way. Unless coercion produces a confounding effect, which implies the behavioral acquiescence of the population has been ominously withdrawn, citizens should prioritize their physical integrity as part of their calculations about authoritarian elections.

Hypothesis 2C. Turnout will be higher when citizens are threatened with political killings and torture by the government.

A common corollary to the use of coercion is clientelism. This non-programmatic mode of distribution denotes the conditional exchange of targeted benefits for political support (see Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2007; Mares and Young, 2016). It functions according to the presence of dyadic relationships, contingency, hierarchy and iteration (Hicken, 2011). The last two of these characteristics are important for distinguishing exchanges produced as a result of repetitive clientelist dynamics or as part of a one-off transaction. Absent an expectation of future interaction, the latter mode of distribution cannot overcome inherent problems of compliance and monitoring. In Egypt, citizens exchange their votes for cash handouts, but also electronic goods, infrastructure projects, jobs and even criminal leniency (Blaydes, 2011). In Russia, vertical administrative and resource dependency led to higher turnout mobilization in specific demographic localities during the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections (Saikkonen, 2017). Such examples also underscore an important distinction worth further discussion.

The practice of clientelism is stress tested at two moments during elections in authoritarian regimes. First, citizens must decide whether the benefits promised to them as part of the exchange agreement will or will not illicit their participation. In the same way that coercion involves a calculation of expected physical gains/losses, clientelism concerns expected material gains/losses. An outstanding question, however, is whether ruling parties target inducement at known supporters or swing voters (Stokes et al., 2013; Gutiérrez-Romero et al., 2014). Given our focus on turnout amongst all citizens (rather than a sub-group of them), we do not offer an answer to this question. Second, citizens who do participate must subsequently decide whether the benefits promised to them warrant voting for the ruling party or reneging on the deal. This decision is dependent upon the perceived reliability of the monitoring techniques being employed, be it electronic surveillance, machine politics, marked vote cards, revolving ballots or constituency-level outcomes (Stokes, 2005). Such manipulation and misconduct undeniably have an inordinate impact on the calculus of voting in authoritarian regimes, especially when compared to democratic regimes.

It is between these two junctures that our investigation is confined. The hypothesis pursued here is limited to explaining participation, rather than the value of that participation to authoritarian regimes. The resulting claim is that clientelist exchange increases election turnout because it incentivizes participation in ways that are both favorable and otherwise unavailable to citizens.

Hypothesis 3. Turnout will be higher when clientelism (via targeted benefits) is prevalent.

The preceding section advanced three explanations for election turnout in authoritarian regimes.¹ Our first argument centered on how

¹ We acknowledge the existence of different subtypes of authoritarian rule (see, for example, Geddes et al. 2014; Magaloni et al., 2013). Since we have no theoretical expectations about how such differences would affect election turnout, we do not offer any related hypotheses. In the between results section, however, we include robustness checks 30 and 31 considering these classification schemes. The results are unaltered.

contestation, along with the occurrence of opposition boycotts, had an influence on the participation rates of citizens. The other arguments we put forward were that the use of coercion and clientelism increase participation rates.

3. Research design

This section details the data and methodology used to analyze how contestation, coercion and clientelism explains turnout in authoritarian elections.

3.1. Dependent variable

The existing scholarship on election participation in democratic regimes presents two main options for measuring turnout: voting age population and registered voters. When analyzing democracies, the arguments defending both approaches are sound. In defense of registration figures, it is argued that voting age population is not adjusted by alien population, which artificially downplays turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998). In defense of voting age population, it is argued that registration and voting are either correlated or the “ratio of voters to registered voters is a biased measure of citizen’s motivation to vote” (Endersby and Kriekchaus, 2008, 602). A solution would be to use both approaches to test our hypotheses.

Any examination of citizen participation in authoritarian elections, however, needs to be circumscribed to registered voters. The argument that voting registration and actual voting are related is less strong under authoritarianism than democracy. This is owing to fundamental differences in turnout. Take the case of Kuwait. The registry figures report that turnout has ranged from 90 percent in 1961 to 60 percent in 1975, but the voting age population figures report a range from 6.2 percent to 6.7 percent for those same elections. A major reason for this discrepancy is that only men over 21 years old residing “in the country since before 1920, to their descendants, to the sons of naturalized Kuwaitis and to naturalized citizens who have completed a waiting period of 20 years” were allowed to vote (Koch, 2001, 159). Another reason is the high percentage of immigrant population that forms the labor force: expatriates are counted as population but not as voters. Finally, people in prison are less likely to be registered voters and those imprisoned are not negligible numbers in many countries. Taken together, a turnout indicator based on voting age population is not a measure of citizen motivation to vote, but their ability to do so. In addition, there are many instances where the voting age population data is either unavailable or outdated.²

To create the dependent variable based on the registered voters, we utilized turnout data from Nohlen et al. (1999, 2001b; 2001a). Depending on the exact edition, the data covers 1945 to 2005. We corroborated this data with that from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. For the period in which the two sources overlap (1950–2005), the correlation between the data is over 0.97. The difference on the reported turnout is less than 1 percent in over 80 percent of the cases, while the divergences do not surpass 5 percent in over 91 percent of the overlapping cases. For the remaining years (2006–2011), and aiming to maximize the number of cases, we relied on the Inter Parliamentary Union, the African Elections Database and Adam Carr’s website for the necessary data.

How reliable is this data? We argue that the substantive variation within countries demonstrates restraint when it comes to the counting, tabulation and reporting of election data. In Senegal, for example,

² McDonald and Popkin (2001) use voting age population to measure turnout by correcting with voting-eligible population data. Stockemer (2017) estimates the voting-eligible population for 500 elections in 116 democracies, which included foreigners living in the country and the number of expatriates. Both calculations nevertheless exclude authoritarian regimes.




Fig. 1. Election turnout in authoritarian regimes (1960–2011).

turnout was 97.0 percent in the 1973 election and 62.0 percent in the 1978 election. The considerable energy, resources and time devoted to mobilizing citizens would also be logically unnecessary if the intention was to simply publish arbitrary turnout figures. This fact is underscored by Karklins (1986, 450), who detailed how “Soviet citizens were exposed to election campaigns for an average of one and a half months per year.” Finally, many inter-governmental organizations obtain their data from authoritarian governments. It is not logical to defend the validity of that data and treat turnout data as invalid.

Our dataset captures significant variation in voter participation rates for legislative elections in authoritarian regimes. This manifests in a few different ways (see Fig. 1) and provides equal support for both sides of the debate on whether authoritarian regimes prefer more or less turnout. The left graph shows substantive variation ranging from 24 percent in Ghana (1992) and Guatemala (1994) to 100 percent in Albania (1982) and Mongolia (1977). The mean turnout rate for all authoritarian regimes – empirically defined as those with 0.4 or below on the Unified Democracy Scores – is 70.9 percent for the 1960–2011 period (Pemstein et al., 2010). The right graph shows substantive differences in turnout depending upon the competitiveness of legislative elections. The mean rates were 66.2 percent across 384 competitive elections and 81.9 percent across 164 uncompetitive elections, respectively.

Table 1 below offers a temporal description of turnout in authoritarian regimes. It shows the proportion of multi-party elections have been steadily increasing at the expense of one-party elections. Turnout rates have also behaved slightly different. In contrast to competitive elections, which remained consistent over the past five decades, participation in uncompetitive elections decreased 9 percentage points.

3.2. Independent variables

Our first Hypothesis (H1) states that voter turnout will be higher in uncompetitive elections than in competitive elections. Using the work of Schedler (2013), the difference was the greater ability of one-party authoritarian regimes to extract both voluntary and involuntary compliance from citizens. The variable capturing this distinction comes from the work of Skanning et al. who developed a lexicographic index of electoral democracy based on seven conditions. The condition relevant to our analysis is whether the elections for the lower house were multi-party or not.³ This provides the dichotomous criterion needed to distinguish authoritarian regimes by contestation. A supplementary hypothesis (H1A) posited that election turnout will be lower with an

³ Specifically, Skaaning et al. (2015) use a value of 1 if “parties are not banned and (a) more than one party is allowed to compete or (b) elections are nonpartisan (i.e., all candidates run without party labels).”

Table 1
Election turnout in authoritarian regimes (by decade).

Regime Type	1960's	1970's	1980's	1990's	2000's
Competitive	65.1 (33)	65.7 (49)	71.4 (55)	66.4 (111)	64.4 (136)
Uncompetitive	88.0 (30)	86.6 (46)	80.2 (49)	70.1 (24)	79.0 (15)
Total	76.0 (63)	75.8 (95)	75.6 (104)	67.1 (135)	65.9 (151)

The number of cases is in the parenthesis.

opposition boycott. To test this relationship, we employed data collected by the Varieties of Democracy project.⁴

The previous section advanced two further claims to explain election turnout in authoritarian regimes. Our second hypothesis focused on how higher levels of coercion increased participation due to the application of a “negative” enlistment incentive. Since the target, scale and severity of coercion can vary, however, we consider whether opposition candidates, parties or campaign workers were subjected to intimidation by the government, the ruling party or their agents (H2A); civilians were subjected to intimidation by other civilians during the electoral cycle (H2B); and citizens were secured from political killings and torture by the government (H2C).⁵ The data for each measure of coercion is again sourced from the Varieties of Democracy project and the correlation amongst the relevant variables is below 0.48. Our third hypothesis focused on how clientelism increased participation, whereby the use of a “positive” enlistment incentive directed at citizens is dependent upon the distribution of targeted benefits (H3). This variable is captured as part of the Varieties of Democracy project.⁶

3.3. Control variables

To explain election turnout in authoritarian regimes, a range of potential competing explanations are controlled for in this paper. The “institutional” control variables include whether voting was or was not compulsory, which has previously been found to be a prominent and positive stimuli for election participation. Another control is whether elections for different occurred concurrently, which has similarly been shown to increase turnout in democratic regimes. A final institutional control is the type of electoral system. Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), for example, revealed that participation is slightly higher – but not statistically significant – in proportional systems than alternative arrangements. The data for the above variables has been sourced from Nohlen et al. and the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The “socioeconomic” control variables include country population (logged) and the Herfindahl Index of ethnic fragmentation, both of which have been shown to decrease election turnout in democracies (Gleditsch,

⁴ The ordinal form of the H1A variable (Coppedge et al., 2017; v2elboycot) has five categories ranging from a total boycott (0) to nonexistent boycott (4). The scale has been inverted.

⁵ The ordinal form of the H2A variable (Coppedge et al., 2017; v2elintim) recognizes five categories ranging “the repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet” (0) to a “there was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents during the election campaign period and polling day” (4). The ordinal form of the H2B variable (Coppedge et al., 2017; v2elpeace) has five categories ranging from “widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country” (0) to “no election-related violence between civilians occurred” (4). The interval version of these variables has been inverted and utilized. The same applies for the H2C variable (Coppedge et al., 2017; v2x_clphy).

⁶ According to Coppedge et al. (2017: v2elvotbuy), “Turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for.” It does not include legislation targeted to concrete constituencies. The ordinal form of this H2 variable recognizes five categories ranging from systematic, widespread turnout buying (0) to none (4). The interval version has been inverted and utilized.

2002; Blais and Carty, 1990; Martinez i Coma and Nai, 2017). In addition, logarithms for the gross domestic product per capita in US dollars and percentage of urban population are utilized (Gleditsch, 2002; Blais, 2006). The necessary data for all the above control variables was retrieved from the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al., 2016).

We also control for whether the country was within the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union. The rationale for doing so is that legislative elections were held, but the hegemonic vanguard authority of the national communist parties meant high participation was always achieved. This means there was a distinct lack of turnout variation in this region of the world between 1960 and 1991. Using a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if this is the case, our expectation is that there is a positive relationship between association with the Soviet Union and citizen turnout election participation. Another variable gathers the number of national elections that authoritarian regimes have sanctioned since 1945, including a dummy variable for those held before the end of the Cold War in 1991. The final control is the dependent variable lagged. Although the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable suppresses the explanatory power of other variables and inflates the amount of variation explained (Achen, 2000), its inclusion seems theoretically valid as past turnout can be a determinant of current turnout (Franklin, 2004). Hence, we opt to include the lagged dependent variable in our main model. (In appendix E, we re-estimate the main model and the robustness checks excluding previous turnout and the results do not change). The correlation among these variables is reasonable and only previous turnout overpasses 0.7 with the actual turnout. Table A in the appendix presents a summary of all the variables used in the analysis (including controls and robustness checks).

The subsequent analysis includes 548 parliamentary elections in 108 countries between 1960 and 2011 (see Appendix B for a list). The structure of the data is of an unbalanced panel. Following previous works (Franklin, 2004; Lago et al., 2017), and addressing time-serial dependencies and correlated error terms within panels, we use generalized least squares regression models with panel corrected standard errors that are further corrected for panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Such models retain cross-country effect, while accounting for the effect of time-serial dependencies. Alternative models, based on fixed effects and random effects, are included as robustness checks (see Appendix F and G).

4. Results

Our initial determinant for citizen participation in flawed elections is contestation. The hypothesis (H1) that turnout will be higher in uncompetitive elections than competitive elections is confirmed in the statistical model (columns 3 and 9 in Table 2).⁷ All else being constant, turnout is almost 4 points higher in the former than the latter. This result is indicative of the rigid compliance authoritarian regimes sanctioning one-party elections can generate through a self-enforcing equilibrium of lower uncertainty and higher manipulation (Schedler, 2013). The higher uncertainty and lower manipulation underpinning de jure competitive elections, by contrast, means the participation rates vary more significantly. This effect is especially pronounced when opposition parties choose to boycott flawed elections, which we confirmed lowers turnout (H1A). The case of Cameroon provides an illustration of the hypothesized relationship between contestation, opposition boycotts and citizen behavior in authoritarian elections. The five uncompetitive elections that occurred throughout the 1970s and 1980s had an average turnout rate of 96.6 percent. This was followed by competitive elections in 1992 (60.7 percent turnout with an opposition boycott) and in 1997 (75.6

⁷ Two controls positively affect turnout (whether the legislative elections were concurrent with executive elections; previous turnout). In addition, the percentage of urban population – in its logged form – shows a negative and significant relationship.

Table 2
Turnout determinants for legislative elections in authoritarian regimes, 1960–2011.

	Base	H1	H1A	H2A	H2B	H2C	H3	Main Model
Ethnic fragmentation	-2.022 (2.422)	-2.500 (2.336)	-1.803 (2.384)	-0.188 (2.341)	-0.412 (2.299)	-1.755 (2.401)	-1.147 (2.308)	0.269 (2.217)
Population (log)	-0.610 (0.373)	-0.514 (0.376)	-0.560 (0.375)	-0.892** (0.377)	-0.320 (0.372)	-0.714* (0.397)	-0.242 (0.375)	-0.440 (0.375)
GDP pc (log)	0.631 (0.866)	1.143 (0.865)	0.611 (0.868)	1.187 (0.888)	0.198 (0.866)	0.851 (0.888)	0.694 (0.860)	1.319 (0.853)
Urban rate (log)	-2.340 (1.637)	-2.264 (1.611)	-2.302 (1.641)	-3.288** (1.615)	-3.135* (1.642)	-2.177 (1.645)	-2.547 (1.614)	-3.205** (1.516)
Soviet	4.382*** (1.695)	3.701** (1.649)	4.315** (1.716)	3.420** (1.657)	3.398** (1.647)	4.232** (1.692)	2.160 (1.649)	-1.037 (1.617)
Compulsory	0.806 (1.433)	1.127 (1.417)	0.724 (1.427)	1.029 (1.457)	0.581 (1.370)	0.605 (1.450)	0.823 (1.362)	2.060 (1.348)
Concurrent	3.112** (1.521)	3.070** (1.495)	2.963* (1.529)	2.855* (1.503)	3.055** (1.472)	3.154** (1.524)	3.396** (1.488)	3.300** (1.425)
PR	-0.242 (1.611)	-0.756 (1.598)	-0.302 (1.621)	0.486 (1.547)	0.411 (1.515)	-0.508 (1.636)	-1.059 (1.520)	-0.162 (1.550)
Maj	-0.407 (1.440)	-0.417 (1.397)	-0.532 (1.454)	-0.771 (1.440)	-0.791 (1.415)	-0.420 (1.443)	-2.070 (1.430)	-2.254 (1.378)
Year 91onward	-3.036** (1.262)	-1.040 (1.309)	-3.086** (1.247)	-2.883** (1.219)	-3.401*** (1.199)	-2.693** (1.297)	-3.129*** (1.196)	-0.154 (1.263)
# of elections	-0.102 (0.193)	-0.0458 (0.192)	-0.0969 (0.195)	0.0486 (0.187)	-0.0118 (0.181)	-0.111 (0.196)	-0.165 (0.185)	-0.117 (0.189)
Previous turnout	0.633*** (0.0350)	0.603*** (0.0359)	0.631*** (0.0348)	0.626*** (0.0340)	0.605*** (0.0353)	0.635*** (0.0351)	0.592*** (0.0362)	0.515*** (0.0360)
Form of contestation (H1)		-6.440*** (1.504)						-3.786** (1.478)
Opposition boycott (H1A)			-1.147* (0.674)					-1.899*** (0.729)
Opposition actors (H2A)				1.704*** (0.551)				2.999*** (0.601)
Coercion: Violent atmosphere (H2B)					-2.390*** (0.547)			-1.835*** (0.568)
Coercion: High intensity (H2C)						2.960 (2.691)		1.800 (2.944)
Clientelist exchange (H3)							-2.762*** (0.557)	-2.520*** (0.603)
Constant	36.38*** (7.316)	36.53*** (7.261)	36.87*** (7.374)	35.49*** (7.132)	41.70*** (7.446)	36.05*** (7.349)	39.00*** (7.044)	43.86*** (7.203)
Number of elections	560	553	549	548	548	553	548	548
Number of countries	112	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
Overall R ²	0.511	0.538	0.522	0.540	0.560	0.517	0.578	0.592

Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

percent turnout without an opposition boycott).

The relationship between coercion and voter turnout was subject to a distinction between the intended target, scale and severity. Our hypothesis that coercion towards opposition candidates, parties and workers increases participation (H2A) was not rejected. This result lends weight to the qualified findings of Hafner-Burton et al. (2016), who presented suggestive evidence that pre-election violence increased turnout in competitive races sanctioned by a mix of authoritarian and democratic regimes between 1981 and 2004. Our next hypothesis concerned the broader atmosphere surrounding elections, specifically whether civilian-on-civilian coercion increased turnout (H2B). The negative coefficient instead shows that voter turnout declines in this context. Our final hypothesis relating to coercion examined whether political killings and torture by the government increased turnout (H2C). Here no significant effect was found, but a positive relationship exists. The election history of Azerbaijan, Honduras, Laos, Morocco and Turkey, feature this relationship. What is peculiar about the above results is that all the hypothesis shared the same underlying logic – i.e., the more prevalent coercion, the higher citizen turnout. Our results, however, showed two positive relationships and one negative relationship. What might account for this variation? We argue that because coercion against opposition candidates, parties and workers (H2A) as well as the use of political killings and torture by the government (H2C) are focused on predetermined and specific targets, they produce a different effect to civilian-on-civilian coercion (H2B). The randomness of the latter form of violence encourages citizens to abstain from entering the electoral

arena, whereby they collectively stay away from the voting booths in order to mitigate a manifest risk of participation.

The final hypothesis concerned the effect clientelism had on election turnout in authoritarian regimes (H3). Here we argued that citizen participation increases because this tactic incentivizes participation in ways that are favorable and otherwise unavailable to them. Against expectations, however, the opposite effect was found: clientelism decreases election turnout in authoritarian elections. Albania, Madagascar and Pakistan offer evidence of how the accumulative distribution of targeted benefits has lowered turnout amongst citizens. To account for this counterintuitive and interesting finding, we offer three explanations: too little, too much and too disorganized.

Our first explanation proposes that some citizens have a pre-conceived expectation regarding the distribution of targeted benefits. This implies ruling parties must offer a minimum amount of money, goods or services to garner their participation. A critical consideration is whether the proposed inducement worsens the baseline conditions of citizens; i.e., is their status negatively affected if they turn down the benefits? This outcome is indicative of how mobilization strategies based on coercion hold more severe normative implications for citizens than clientelism (Mares and Young, 2016). In Cambodia citizens have previously complained about how the offering of food seasoning, scarves and skirts by the ruling party was insufficient to purchase their participation (Morgenbesser, 2016b, 77). Despite how this example demonstrates the existence of minimum limits for clientelism, the inter-subjectivity of this expectation puts enormous pressure on the financial and organizational

resources of authoritarian regimes. Not only does an exchange require knowledge of the permissible range of targeted benefits for voters, constituencies and elections, but it also demands a capacity to act on that knowledge at the local, regional and national level. When clientelism is expected to lower turnout, authoritarian regimes might subsequently resort to coercion as an alternative mobilization strategy.

Our second explanation proposes that some citizens respond unfavorably to excessive clientelism. This is because the distribution of targeted benefits by ruling parties exceeds an undefined maximum permissible amount. A direct consequence of this breach is that it contributes to negative perceptions of electoral integrity and, by extension, lowers the value of participation. In an analysis of Nigerian elections, Bratton (2008) found that 58 percent of citizens thought it is wrong and punishable to buy votes and 49 percent believed it is wrong and punishable to sell votes. The cases of Gabon, Kyrgyzstan and Mauritania, which have high clientelism but low turnout, further illustrate how this morality effect eventuates. Given the suggestion that clientelism is constrained by both minimum and maximum limits, however, what is the optimal strategy for mobilizing citizens? Argentina, Botswana, Ecuador and Tanzania testify to the high turnout that can be produced through low voter coercion and low clientelism (i.e., negative values for both independent variables). This ostensibly requires ruling parties to build and maintain an accountable, clean and effective government, which might motivate citizens to turnout based on some sense of normative agreement. Beyond this approach, which is hardly the norm for authoritarian regimes, lax control on the exorbitance of clientelism will continue to disincentive citizens into turning out for elections.

Our third explanation for why clientelism decreases turnout is disorganization surrounding its implementation. Earlier, it was argued that clientelism is tested in two specific ways: do citizens agree to participate in accordance with the exchange agreement and, subsequently, do they honor that agreement by participating? This “double persuasion” test highlights important differences between the ex-ante promises of the campaign period and the ex post outcomes of voting day. In contrast to the two previous explanations, this explanation addresses the second commitment. Assuming an agreeable exchange agreement exists, citizens may nevertheless renege on their deal because they doubt the capacity of ruling parties to monitor them. Since monitoring collective returns is easier than monitoring individual behavior, it is conceivable that participation could decrease in spite of clientelism (Frye et al., 2017). In democratic Argentina, Nichter (2008) finds that political parties avoid the commitment problem by instead mobilizing voters that they expect to support the party but would not otherwise turnout to vote. Across the universe of authoritarian regimes, widespread variation in the effectiveness of different monitoring mechanisms means citizens form different expectations about the risks of violating the exchange agreement. So regardless of how appealing the distribution of benefits is to citizens, delivery does not necessarily presage their compliant participation.⁸

4.1. Robustness of results

Guided by nine different criterion, we ran 33 robustness checks (RC) for the main model in Table 2. The first of these criteria concerns the definition of authoritarian rule. Given that the 0.4 threshold for defining authoritarian regimes is attributed arbitrarily, RC1 varies the threshold by decreasing it to 0.3 (excluding countries such as Armenia in 2003 and Botswana in 1989), while RC2 increases it to 0.5 (including countries such as Argentina in 1983 and Dominican Republic in 1978). The more

⁸ An alternative explanation is that the authoritarian regimes most likely to engage in clientelism are those most dependent on it (for one reason or another). Since our aim was to offer a general explanation for election turnout in authoritarian regimes, the possibility of endogeneity is recognized but not addressed.

relaxed the definition of authoritarianism, the higher the number of cases; while the more demanding the definition, the lower the number of cases. We also recognize the existence of several other definitions of authoritarianism. Hence, RC3 to RC5 rely on those provided by Cheibub et al. (2010), Boix et al. (2013) and Magaloni et al. (2013). Another important factor to consider is the elections that portray very high turnout. RC6 and RC7 therefore drop the elections with turnout over 90 and 95 percent, respectively. This substantially decreases the number of cases.

We also utilize several alternative measures of the independent variables. Instead of data from the Varieties of Democracy, RC8 to RC11 test the hypotheses with data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov, 2012), The Political Terror Scale (Wood and Gibney, 2010), and the CIRI Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli et al., 2014).⁹ The sensitivity of the results is also evaluated using two alternative estimation methods. We rely on OLS with country fixed effects in RC12 and random effects in RC13.

RC14 to RC19 tests whether the results are stable when a set of countries or continents are dropped, such as those within the satellite sphere of the Soviet Union. In addition, RC20 to RC26 analyze the data by excluding all observations before and after 1991 as well as all observations within a decade.

To address reverse causality concerns, we implemented further robustness checks. RC27 lags the independent variables of interest; RC28 omits one independent variable at a time to observe whether the results are sensitive to the specific controls that have been included; and RC29 replicates the rationale of RC28, but with variables of interest lagged.

Finally, we have re-estimated our original model including a series of variables that previous works have signaled as relevant and we do not include in our theoretical framework (see RC30 to RC33). The variables are regime subtype (from the Geddes et al. 2014 and Magaloni et al., 2013 classification schemes) and NELDA polling outcomes, which includes the margin of victory in prior elections (see RC30 and 31). All tables are in online appendix C.

To further show that the results are not driven by unusual observations or outliers, we use a jackknife procedure to drop each country at a time and then re-estimate the main model of Table 2. Each point in each graph of online Appendix D’s figure shows the value of the t-statistics for the six independent variables of interest when sequentially excluding one country. After separately estimating 108 models, the results are clearly not conditioned by any specific country. In addition, models and robustness checks have been run again to exclude the previous value of turnout (lagged dependent variable). The results for the additional 33 models – displayed in online Appendix E – show virtually the same results. Finally, online appendixes F and G present the main model and the 33 RCs for fixed and random effects, respectively.

The main conclusion is that the findings are robust. The hypothesis that contestation explains turnout (H1) is significant in 24 of the 33 RCs. In addition, where opposition parties boycott elections (H1A), the results are consistent across 27 of the 33 RCs. On the relationship between coercion and turnout, intimidation against opposition actors (H2A) is robust in 33 RCs; violence between citizens (H2B) is robust in 30 RCs; and the use of high-intensity repression by the government (H2C) is the same in 33 RCs. Most importantly, the results for Hypothesis 3 are the same in all 33 alternative specifications, which demonstrates that clientelism is associated with lower turnout. The signs of all the coefficients for all RCs are the same as in the main model. When the variables lose significance, all the coefficients show the same sign. In

⁹ Specifically, we include two separate versions of competitive elections (H1), understood as if opposition was allowed (RC7) or whether more than one party was legal (RC8); an alternative version of government intimidation, understood in NELDA as government harassment to the opposition; and NELDA’s version of whether there was a boycott.

addition, when results are not robust (RCs 7, 8, 9, 21, 30 and 31), it is due to the significant decrease in the number of cases – ranging from 75 to 274 elections – and the use of alternative sources. Overall, election turnout in authoritarian regimes is positively affected by contestation and coercion, but negatively affected by clientelism.

5. Conclusion

We explained election turnout in authoritarian regimes. Utilizing a dataset of 548 elections in 108 countries between 1960 and 2011, we theorized that contestation, coercion and clientelism accounted for the participation rates observed. The first contribution focused on how turnout varied according to not only the institutionalization of multi-party or one-party elections, but the contingent occurrence of opposition boycotts. The second contribution revolved around how ruling parties influenced participation through the threat or use of coercion and reliance upon clientelism. By undertaking the most comprehensive comparative study of election turnout in authoritarian regimes to date, we helped alleviate the paucity of theory building on voter behavior in authoritarian elections. This contribution provides a foundation for further research.

Notwithstanding our theoretical and empirical insights, the specific issue of election turnout in authoritarian regimes warrants further attention. On the one hand, it is clear many authoritarian regimes try to boost turnout as a way of demonstrating electoral integrity, asserting popular legitimacy and judging the competence, loyalty and trajectory of their political elites. The opening examples of Bangladesh and Togo were typical of this approach. On the other hand, our dataset captures many authoritarian regimes with extended periods of low turnout. Instead of targeting just non-aligned voters, they appear to prefer an entirely apathetic and disengaged citizenry. The examples of Burkina Faso from 1970 to 1997, El Salvador from 1948 to 1982 and Pakistan from 1976 to 1988 were typical of this approach. A key task for future research is to determine under what conditions authoritarian regimes prefer higher or lower turnout.

Another research direction concerns the interaction effects between the independent variables and election turnout in authoritarian regimes. Even though we chose not to investigate these relationships, a few intuitive hypotheses are warranted. First, an opposition boycott presumably makes clientelism less necessary because “winning” the election is now expedited by the lack of competition. Not only is the ruling party less incentivized to buy votes, but citizens will become less constrained by demands for contingency (Grzymala-Busse, 2008). Second, the interaction between opposition boycott and coercion is presumably different. The abstention of these groups compels authoritarian regimes to boost turnout as a way of undercutting subsequent claims that the election lacked credibility and legitimacy. Given that citizens conceivably prioritize their expected physical gains/losses over their expected material gains/losses, coercion represents an alternative mobilization

tool. What is missing from the above relationships is the role of state power – i.e., the capacity of authoritarian regimes to ‘penetrate society, regulate social relations, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways’ (Andersen et al., 2014, 1306). Due to a lack of cross-national time series data, we assumed that all authoritarian regimes were equally capable. An obvious direction for future research – data permitting – would be to produce a better measure of how, when and where state capacity matters for coercion and clientelism.

A more general line of enquiry would be to investigate the intervening effect of election turnout on established theories of authoritarian politics. The dominant focus within the scholarship has been on the meta-game of flawed elections as imperfect opportunities for institutional change. By isolating the effects contestation, coercion and clientelism have on the interplay between ruling parties and citizens, we offered new insights on the regime-specific dynamics of authoritarian politics. This includes how voter turnout impacts the functions of flawed elections; emergence of democracy protests; response of international actors to electoral norm violations; and democratizing power of repetitive elections (Morgenbesser, 2016b; Brancati, 2016; Donno, 2013a; Lindberg, 2009). Our paper is also relevant for research on the forensic analysis of flawed elections, which assumes misconduct and manipulation increase turnout without specifying the tools underlying that effect. Besides the “wholly innocuous reasons” that explain skewed turnout distribution in fraudulent elections, we demonstrated the more substantive contribution of coercion and clientelism (Myagkov et al., 2009). Despite positioning elections as either a dependent or independent variable, many such theories of authoritarian politics rarely consider the varying participation of them relevant to the causal question under investigation. The dataset introduced and utilized here offers a new resource for theorizing and empirically testing these causal relationships. The benefit would be a deeper understanding of authoritarian politics.

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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Turnout	548	70.9	19.1	21	1000	IDEA, Nohlen et al.
Variables of interest						
Form of contestation (H1)	548	.70	.458	0	1	Skaaning et al. (2015)
Boycott (H1A)	548	.62	.92	0	4	V-Dem
Coercion: Opposition actors (H2A)	548	.78	1.14	-1.93	3.9	V-Dem
Coercion: Violent atmosphere (H2B)	548	.21	1.18	-1.93	3.86	V-Dem
Coercion: High-intensity (H2C)	548	-.46	.25	-.95	-.02	V-Dem
Clientelist exchange (H3)	548	.52	1.15	-2.4	2.89	V-Dem
Opposition allowed (H1)						NELDA
More one party legal						NELDA
Boycott (H1A)						NELDA
Opposition coercion (H2A)						NELDA

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(continued)

Variable	N	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Civilian violence (H2B)						NELDA
Controls						
Socioeconomic						
Fractionalization	548	.515	.248	0	.93	Alesina et al (2003) (QoG)
Population (log)	548	9.04	1.52	4.21	12.2	Gleditsch (2002) (QoG)
GDP per capita (log)	548	7.89	1.02	5.55	13.2	Gleditsch (2002) (QoG)
Urban rate (log)	548	3.61	.584	1.57	4.6	World Bank (QoG)
Institutional						
Compulsory	548	.211	.408	0	1	IDEA
Concurrent elections	548	.233	.423	0	1	IDEA
PR	548	.281	.449	0	1	Nohlen et al., IPU
Majoritarian	548	.459	.498	0	1	Nohlen et al., IPU
Other controls						
Number of elections	548	6.01	3.6	2	21	
1991	548	.5	.5	0	1	
Soviet	548	.127	.334	0	1	
Previous turnout	548	71.6	19.6	20.3	100	Lagged dependent variable

Appendix B. List of elections included in the analysis

Albania	1974	1978	1982	1987	1991	1996	1997	2001		
Algeria	1977	1982	1987	1991	1997	2002	2007			
Angola	2008									
Argentina	1960	1962	1963	1965						
Armenia	1995	1999	2003	2007						
Azerbaijan	1995	2005	2010							
Bangladesh	1979	1986	1988	1991	1996	2001	2008			
Belarus	2000	2004	2008							
Benin	1964	1979	1984	1989						
Bolivia	1960	1964	1966	1979	1980					
Botswana	1969	1974	1979	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004		
Brazil	1966	1970	1974	1978	1982					
Bulgaria	1976	1981	1986	1990						
Burkina Faso	1965	1970	1978	1992	1997	2002	2007			
Burundi	1993	2005	2010							
Cambodia	1976	1981	1998	2003	2008					
Cameroon	1970	1973	1978	1983	1988	1992	1997			
Cape Verde	1985									
Central African Republic	1964	1987	1998	2005						
Chad	1962	1963	1969	1990	1997	2002	2011			
Chile	1973	1989								
Colombia	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1990	1991	1994	1998
	2002	2006	2010							
Comoros	1992									
Congo, Democratic Republic of	1965	1970	1977	2006						
Croatia	1995									
Cyprus	1976									
Côte d'Ivoire	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	2000	2011		
Djibouti	1982	1987	1992	1997	2003	2008				
Dominican Republic	1966	1970	1974	1994						
Ecuador	2006	2007	2009							
Egypt	1984	1987	1990	1995	2005	2010				
El Salvador	1966	1968	1970	1972	1978	1985	1988	1991		
Equatorial Guinea	1999	2004								
Ethiopia	1995	2000	2005	2010						
Fiji	1987	1992	1994							
Gabon	1964	1967	1973	2001	2011					
Gambia	1972	1977	1987	1992	1997	2002	2007			
Georgia	1992	1995	1999	2003	2008					
Ghana	1969	1992								
Guatemala	1961	1966	1970	1985	1994	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Guinea	1968	1974	1995	2002						
Guinea-Bissau	1994	2004	2008							
Guyana	1968	1973	1980	1985	1992	1997	2001	2006		
Honduras	1965	1971	1980	1981	1985	1989	1993	2009		
Hungary	1975	1980	1985							
Indonesia	1971	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997	1999			
Iran, Islamic Republic of	1980	1984	2000	2004	2008					
Iraq	2000	2005	2010							
Jordan	1989	1993	1997	2003	2007	2010				
Kazakhstan	1994	1995	2007							
Kenya	1974	1979	1983	1988	1992	1997	2002	2007		
Korea, Republic of	1963	1967	1971	1973	1978	1981	1985			
Kuwait	1963	1967	1971	1975	1981	1985	1992	1996	1999	2006

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(continued)

	2008	2009								
Kyrgyzstan	1995	2000	2005	2007	2010					
Lao People's Dem, Republic	1972	1989	1992	1997	2002	2006	2011			
Lebanon	1960	1964	1968	1972	1992	1996	2000	2005	2009	
Lesotho	1993	2002	2007							
Liberia	1997	2005	2011							
Madagascar	1965	1970	1983	1989	1993	1998	2002			
Malawi	2004	2009								
Malaysia	1969	1974	1978	1982	1986	1990	1995	1999	2008	
Mali	1979	1982	1988	1997	2002	2007				
Mauritania	1971	1975	1992	1996	2001	2006				
Mexico	1970	1973	1976	1979	1982	1985	1988	1991	1994	1997
Mongolia	1960	1963	1966	1969	1973	1977	1981	1986	1990	
Morocco	1970	1977	1984	1993	1997	2002	2007	2011		
Mozambique	1999	2004	2009							
Myanmar	1960	1974	1978	1981	1985	1990	2010			
Namibia	1994	1999	2004							
Nepal	1981	1986	1994	1999	2008					
Nicaragua	1972	1974								
Niger	1970	1989	1996	2004	2011					
Nigeria	1983	1999	2003							
Pakistan	1977	1985	1988	1993	1997	2002	2008			
Panama	1978	1984								
Paraguay	1968	1973	1978	1983	1988	1989	1993	1998	2003	
Peru	1990	1995	2000							
Philippines	1961	1965	1969	1978						
Poland	1972	1976	1980	1985						
Russian Federation	1993	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011				
Rwanda	2003	2008								
Senegal	1963	1968	1973	1978	1983	1988	1993	1998	2001	
Seychelles	1987	1992	1993	1998	2002	2007				
Sierra Leone	2002	2007								
Singapore	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1991	1997	2001	2006
	2011									
Solomon Islands	2001									
South Africa	1961	1966	1970	1974	1977	1981	1987	1989		
Sri Lanka	1989	1994	2000	2010						
Sudan	1968	1986	1996							
Suriname	1987	1991								
Swaziland	1972	1978	1993	1998						
Syrian Arab Republic	1994	1998	2003	2007						
Tajikistan	2000	2005	2010							
Tanzania, United Republic of	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	
Thailand	1969	1975	1976	1979	1983	1986	1988	1992	2007	2011
Togo	1961	1963	1979	1985	1990	1994	2002	2007		
Trinidad and Tobago	1971									
Tunisia	1964	1969	1974	1979	1981	1986	1989	1994	1999	2004
	2009	2011								
Turkey	1961	1973	1983	1987	1995	1999				
Turkmenistan	1994	1999	2004	2008						
Uganda	1980	1996	2001	2006	2011					
Ukraine	1998									
Uruguay	1984									
Uzbekistan	1994	1999	2004	2010						
Vanuatu	1983									
Venezuela	2005	2010								
Zambia	1978	1983	1991	1996	2001	2006				
Zimbabwe	1990	1995	2005	2008						

Appendix C. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102222>.

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